Saturday, March 18, 2017

The IRGC was once again unleashed during the 2009 uprisings to quell any pro-democracy demands. They Guards went on a spree of arresting thousands, torturing hundreds and secretly executing dozens.

Through the years the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), has become the main backbone of Iran’s political, military, economic and social crackdown apparatus.

Through the years the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), has become the main backbone of Iran’s political, military, economic and social crackdown apparatus.


INU - Ever since the 1979 revolution, the Iranian regime and supreme leader needed a leverage to erect major defense lines in the face of domestic threats (protests and uprisings) and simultaneously pursue its foreign objectives. Based on this mentality, the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) was established in the early days as the entity under the supreme leader’s supervision. Ever since, it has played the main role in Iran’s such campaigns.


Through the years the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), has become the main backbone of Iran’s political, military, economic and social crackdown apparatus.


Establishing the IRGC
The original motive behind the formation of the IRGC on May 5th, 1979, meaning less than three months after Iran’s revolution, can be described as the regime intending to establish an ideologically-motivated military entity parallel to the classic army.

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Wednesday, March 15, 2017

Iran's Relations With Al-Qaeda: Al Arabiya

 NCRI Iran News | Terrorism and Fundamentalism


NCRI Iran News | Terrorism and Fundamentalism


There is reason to believe relations between Iran and al-Qaeda date back to the early 1990s. Contacts between Tehran and al-Qaeda began when bin Laden was in Sudan, and continued following his transfer to Afghanistan. The bilateral relations played an active role in developments that led the 9/11 attacks in New York and hundreds of al-Qaeda senior and low-ranking members fleeing from the Afghanistan hills into Iran following the US-led war in Afghanistan. Numerous al-Qaeda members remain in Iran, including:
Feysal Khlaedi, in charge of relations between al-Qaeda and Pakistan Taliban.


Mohamed Ibrahim Biumi, who according to the US Treasury Department played a mediator role with Tehran, gathered financial support for al-Qaeda and its branches in Syria.
Abu Bakr Mohamed Mohamed Qamin, in charge of providing money and structuring the al-Qaeda hierarchy in Iran.
Mohsen Fazli, founder of the Khorasan group, who was killed in an airstrike.



Monday, March 13, 2017

Why Iran Regime's Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Should Be Blacklisted?

NCRI Iran News | Terrorism and Fundamentalism

NCRI Iran News | Terrorism and Fundamentalism


March 12, 2017 and the article continues as follows:
Given the other actors involved with the JCPOA and U.N. sanctions on ballistic missiles, Washington has only a few unilateral options for confronting Iranian misbehavior. One of those is designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
The State Department FTO list for 2015, published in June 2016, includes neither the Quds Force nor its parent, the IRGC. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson can add both to the list pursuant to three criteria: They must be foreign organizations engaged in terrorist activity that threatens U.S. persons or U.S. national security (i.e., national defense, foreign relations or the economic interests of the United States). Because of the IRGC-QF's ongoing support for terrorist activities, no justification for its designation is needed. Herein we argue that its parent organization, the IRGC, also merits designation, due to its function as the paymaster of the Quds Force.


The IRGC-QF is not an element of the armed forces subordinate to military leadership; it is a distinct entity that serves the Supreme Leader to guard the Islamic Revolution. As such, it is not in fact a formal governmental entity but an expression of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary movement. This independence from the elected government’s authority makes it a de facto nongovernmental actor operating in an extra-legal fashion, particularly when operating abroad. Thus, any use of violence by the IRGC-QF would be extrajudicial.